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Introduction
Twenty years after its formal independence, Eritrea has become an increasingly failing state.
The country's people suffer from chronic shortages of drinking water, electricity, fuel and basic consumer goods. Adult Eritreans are forced to serve in the military and participate in national service for indefinite periods of time, which has already triggered a mass exodus and continues to compel thousands more men and women to flee the country every month and join the diaspora -this currently accounts for at least one-third of the population. Democracy and the rule of law are absent. Meanwhile, the president, Isaias Afewerki, rules with an iron fist and has weakened or obliterated all significant state institutions -including the judiciary, the legislature and the ruling party.
Due to its belligerent foreign policy and support of armed groups in the Horn of Africa region, the UN imposed sanctions on Eritrea in 2009 -including an arms embargo and asset freezes directed at the ruling elite. It is commonly assumed that the impact of sanctions on autocratic regimes is relatively weak (cf. Lektzian and Souva 2007) , while the reactions of diaspora communities to them are an underresearched topic. This article examines the impact of UN-imposed sanctions on the stability of the Eritrean regime using diaspora behavior as an explanatory variable. It explores the transnational character of Eritrean society, which is characterized by long-distance nationalism. It analyzes the history and structure of the Eritrean diaspora and its transformation since the political crisis of 2001. The paper argues that both government supporters and opponents have instrumentalized the sanctions for their own specific purposes, which has only indirectly contributed to the ongoing demise of Eritrea's rebel regime. Rather, failed domestic policies, the militarization of society, a mass exodus of people and an isolationist foreign policy are the main reasons for the growing weakness of the State of Eritrea.
This article is based on in-depth interviews with Eritreans in opposition to the current regime, official government statements and media reports covering sanctions-related events organized by both government supporters and opponents. It is further informed by the author's long-term participant observation of Eritrean diaspora communities and prolonged stays in Eritrea between 1995 and 2010 -both of which provided her with insights into Eritrea as seen through the lens of the diaspora as well as seen from within.
The second part of this paper provides an overview of Eritrea's short history as an independent nation, its foreign policy and the imposition of UN sanctions. The third part analyzes Eritrea as a transnational society, focusing on the structure and political culture of the diaspora as well as its deep cleavages. The fourth part deals with diaspora reactions to the sanctions regime and describes the respective sanctions-related activities of government supporters and opponents. The fifth part concludes that the effect of sanctions on internal political stability has ultimately only been limited and indirect, while the current demise of the regime is mainly due to the regime's own failed policies.
Eritrea Twenty Years after Independence

From a "Beacon of Hope" to "Africa's North Korea"
Eritrea is a former Italian colony located in the Horn of Africa. Its population of about four million people is composed of nine ethnic groups, divided roughly equally between Muslims and Christians. The Tigrinya (about half of the population) dominate the government, the administration and the military. During World War II, the territory came under British ad- trean Liberation Front (ELF) launched an armed struggle for independence that was to last thirty years. In the early 1970s, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) -under the leadership of today's president, Isaias Afewerki -split from the ELF and has been the dominant force ever since. The EPLF followed an ideology based on self-reliance and Marxism and created strong military and civil institutions, including mass organizations and an efficient secret police in its liberated areas (Pool 2001) . It also established a stronghold among
Eritrean war refugees abroad and extended its mass organizations to all countries with a significant Eritrean exile population. In 1991, the EPLF defeated the Ethiopian army and took control of the government. Following a referendum, the country was internationally recognized as an independent nation in 1993.
In 1994, the EPLF held a congress and renamed itself the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) without making notable changes to its Marxist organizational structure. In its national charter, it set out the guidelines for Eritrea's future and suggested taking a cautious path to democratization (EPLF 1994) -though its vision never actually materialized.
EPLF/PFDJ 1 ideology is shaped by Isaias's 2 own worldview and has a strong Maoist component and emphasizes the principle of self-reliance. During the struggle, the EPLF did not receive support from the Eastern Bloc, which sided with the Marxist Ethiopian Dergue 3 regime, or from Western governments due to its ideological orientation. This led to the emergence of two structural characteristics of the Eritrean regime: the insistence on self-reliance coupled with a deep mistrust toward the international community (including foreign donors) and the instrumentalization of the diaspora as a funding source. The EPLF established basic education and health care systems in the liberated areas and integrated men and women from all different ethnic groups into its structure (Cliffe and Davidson 1988; Connell 1997; Pateman 1990 ). In spite of its strictly hierarchical nature, it gained broad support and was successful in organizing the diaspora, which raised funds both for the war effort and for humanitarian purposes. At the time of independence, the EPLF was welcomed by considerable parts of Eritrean society -although some were reluctant to back it on the grounds of ethnic, religious and/or ideological differences. However, it failed to integrate the different factions of the former ELF into the new political system, and the PFDJ remained the sole party allowed to exist. During the promising early years of independence (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) , most observers envisaged a positive development path being taken (Fengler 2001; Hirt 2001; Iyob 1997; Ottawa 1999) as the government had a clear development strategy based on self-reliance -but also 1 The term EPLF/PFDJ is used when the ruling party is discussed in a context related both to the years before and after the renaming of the EPLF in 1994.
2 Eritreans are always called by their first names; the second name is the father's name.
3 Dergue is Amharic (Ethiopian) for "committee." b) The excessive militarization of society justified by the no war, no peace situation c) An isolationist foreign policy stance following failed attempts to convince the United
States to establish a military base in Eritrea (cf. Hirt 2008) In the aftermath of the war, an internal crisis led to a split within the PFDJ leadership. The year 2001 witnessed a temporary liberalization of the political climate -an emerging free press flourished, while open discussions were held between politicians, students and society at large. Fifteen high-ranking party members (the G15) wrote a letter to the president not only criticizing his authoritarian style of rule and conduct of the war, but also demanding political reform and the holding of elections. However, Isaias cracked down on the movement and arrested eleven 4 of the fifteen in September 2001, along with most of the journalists from the independent press. They have remained in custody without trial ever since, with most of them believed to be dead. A few months earlier, Isaias had crushed the emerging student movement by imprisoning the leader of the student's union and banishing all university students to the desert prison camp Wi'a for several months.
Following these events, the political system shifted toward totalitarianism. 5 Elections were postponed indefinitely and the Constitution sank into oblivion. Eritrea was divided into 4 Three other members of the G15 were either abroad or had renounced their signing of the letter.
5 Juan Linz defines three necessary preconditions for a totalitarian system, which all apply to Eritrea: the existence of an ideology, the presence of a single mass party and other mobilization organizations and power centered around an individual and his collaborators as part of a small group that is not accountable to any large constituency and that cannot be dislodged from power by institutionalized, peaceful means (2000: 67). (Hirt and Saleh 2013; HRW 2009; Kibreab 2009 ). Currently, somewhere between three hundred thousand and six hundred thousand people serve as recruits.
They receive a monthly "salary" equivalent to about 25 EUR and are subject to military discipline even when working in civil activities (Bozzini 2011) . This enduring form of forced labor has led to a mass exodus from Eritrea, turning it into one of the world's leading refugeeproducing countries.
The EPLF/PFDJ government, which came to power as a rebel regime (cf. Hadenius and 
Eritrea as a Regional Spoiler, UN Sanctions and their (Non-)Implementation
Eritrea has poor regional links and was at some point involved in armed conflicts with all of its neighbors (Yemen 1995 , Djibouti 1996 , Ethiopia 1998 -2000 States for being the mastermind behind the sanctions and for having turned the IGAD into a "captive organ" of its Horn of Africa strategy (Hirt 2011: 325) . The "smart sanctions" include an arms embargo, the freezing of foreign assets and a travel ban on leading Eritrean politicians and military commanders. The justification given for the sanction regime was that Eritrea supported armed groups that "undermine peace and reconciliation in Somalia" and that it refrained from withdrawing its troops after clashes with Djibouti in June 2008. A major weakness of the sanctions regime is its failure to tackle the country's dire internal situation -most importantly, the absence of democracy, the lack of human rights, the denial of civil liberties and the prevalence of forced labor. According to recent empirical research by von Soest and Wahman, "authoritarian regimes tend to democratize and become While the sanctions have not brought any changes for the population inside the country, it is crucial to focus on developments in the diaspora -which makes up more than one-third of all Eritreans and is split between government supporters, opposition supporters 7 and a large politically inactive group.
Transnational Eritrean Society
"Long-Distance Nationalism" and a Divided Diaspora
The Eritrean diaspora comprises at least one-third, perhaps one-half, of all Eritrean nationals.
Over one million out of a total of three million Eritreans fled or migrated to foreign countries An important fact to note is that the EPLF successfully conflated itself, the nation and the State of Eritrea based on its identification of with "the people" (or "the masses" in its revolutionary slogan) (Conrad 2010; Hepner 2008; see also, Dorman 2005: 204, 207) . The organization of cultural events and festivals was an important tool for raising funds, strengthening the links between the exiles and the EPLF and fostering a sense of emotional belonging and Eritrean nationalism. Most prominent was the yearly Bologna festival, where exiled Eritreans from all over the world met to celebrate and raise funds and were ideologically streamlined.
The ELF had its own organizations abroad but was less prolific in mobilizing support and channeling funds to its coffers. Nonetheless, the split between the EPLF and the ELF created parallel exile structures that have remained features of the diaspora and continue to play a role up to the present day (Conrad 2010: 42) .
In a surprising move, the EPLF dismantled these mass organizations in 1989 when independence loomed on the horizon -perhaps to limit their political influence on the emerging state. They were replaced by purportedly apolitical community organizations, the so-called mahber.coms (Koser 2003: 113) . At the same time, the EPLF made concerted efforts to incorporate the diaspora into the State of Eritrea by encouraging Eritreans to participate in the 1993 referendum for independence. Those who took part received ID cards so as to officially confirm their Eritrean nationality, while ELF supporters who declined to participate were refused these Eritrean citizenship documents. The new government introduced a diaspora tax for all Eritreans irrespective of their de facto nationality, which stood at 2 percent of their annual income no matter whether it was derived from work or social welfare benefits.
Many migrant-producing states preserve the nationality or citizenship of their emigrants, which Levitt and de la Dehaesa describe as an extension of political rights -including the right to vote from overseas (2003: 590) . In the Eritrean case, however, this meant the extension of financial duties through ideological means and social pressure. However, most Eritreans abroad volunteered to pay the tax during the initial years of independence, which they saw as their just contribution to the reconstruction of the war-torn country (Koser 2003: 114) -except for the group of ardent ELF supporters who felt alienated by the EPLF's exclusion of the ELF splinter groups from political participation in their homeland (Kibreab 2007: 103-104 Eritrean (Bernal 2006: 164) . For this reason, Bettina Conrad (2010) suggests that "longdistance nationalism" might be a better term to use than "transnationalism" when describing the Eritrean diaspora's attitude toward its homeland. This ideological bond that links people to a given territory expresses itself through certain core actions, such as demonstrating, con- When the war with Ethiopia broke out in 1998, the Eritrean government tried to intensify its relations with the diaspora to meet the financial demands of the war. All existing transnational structures of the state -including the embassies and consulates, the reestablished party chapters and the mostly dormant mahber.coms -were mobilized both for fundraising purposes (Hepner 2008: 486) and to spread far and wide the PFDJ's interpretation of the war as an invasion by the TPLF-led Ethiopian government. The state issued bonds to be purchased by the diaspora, which raised about 70 million USD. It also made numerous demands for contributions, ranging from the "one pound a day keeps weyane 8 away" campaign in the United Kingdom to the public announcement of the amounts of individual contributions in Germany (Tecle 2012: 32) . At the same time, the existing transnational institutions were increasingly used as the "watchdogs" of the regime, whose members were obliged to document all forms of dissent to the embassies.
The Structural Transformation of the Diaspora since 2001
Due to both the unsatisfactory outcome of the war that ended in 2000 and the ever-pending implementation of the Constitution, critical voices spread both inside Eritrea and within the diaspora. Members of the latter were as disillusioned as the aforementioned G15 and the flourishing free press in Asmara. Thus, the government had two reasons for reengaging with the diaspora. First, it was in urgent need of hard currency for reconstruction. Second, it wanted to control rising criticism (Koser 2003: 117 ) through a close-knit network of spies and informants. 9
The political landscape of the diaspora has diversified greatly since the end of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War. Before, it had mainly consisted of government supporters and several ELF splinter groups. Following the crackdown on the G15 and the free press, the Eritrean Democratic Party (EDP) emerged as a splinter group comprised of disillusioned PFDJ members, while throughout the past decade a variety of civil society and human rights groups have also arisen -including an active youth movement inspired by the Arab Spring. The ruling elite reacted by establishing the Young PFDJ (YPFDJ) in 2004. Masterminded by Isaias's main ideologist, Yemane Ghebreab, 10 the group is used exclusively as a meeting point for progovernment diaspora youth. Meanwhile, the diaspora community continues to contribute almost one-third of Eritrea's total annual per capita GDP -an incredibly large amount compared to that in other major remittance-receiving countries such as Ghana (7.8 percent) and Egypt fact that created another challenge to the diaspora's capacity to raise and donate money.
Literature on international migration and transnationalism posits that migrants often play an important positive role by fostering societal and political debates in their home country (De Haas 2005 : 1272 , but this has not been the case in Eritrea. Although Koser (2003: 120-121) observed some alienation among government supporters due to the increased financial demands made by both the government and families, "the diaspora, in spite of being the largest provider of foreign currency, has failed to counteract the emergence and consolidation of dictatorship.
[…] The government has effectively reduced the diaspora to a toothless cash cow" (Kibreab 2007: 111) . The reactions of the diverse diaspora groups to the sanctions can only be understood within the framework of their general behavioral patterns with regard to demands from the government. Thus, I will give a description of the techniques used by the government to coerce Eritreans in exile to make contributions -either voluntarily out of conviction or feelings of indebtedness, or involuntarily out of the need for government services.
The most institutionalized way of "milking" the diaspora is the 2 percent tax levied on all
Eritreans abroad irrespective of their nationality (Conrad 2010: 180; Kibreab 2008: 107; Tecle 2013: 28) . Eritrean embassies around the world have been keeping a record of the exact sums every Eritrean has paid since 1991 (de facto independence). 11 Those who pay the tax receive a "clearance" that enables them to enjoy government services such as obtaining birth and marriage certificates, the right to purchase and own land and buildings in Eritrea, to operate a business, get exit visas for elderly relatives or to obtain permission to repatriate the bodies of deceased persons who wished to be buried in their home village. Yet the most important service for many is the extension of passports, the provision of which also depends on the payment of the 2 percent tax. This primarily affects those Eritreans (at least one hundred thousand) who work in Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates and require valid passports to obtain work permits.
Another important source of income can be subsumed under the term "contributions."
This is money collected during fundraising parties and festivals regularly organized by the YPFDJ branches and by the embassies to mark national events, such as Independence Day.
Aside from this, there are the collections for the so-called Hdri (legacy) or Martyr's 12 Trust 11 The author has personally seen tax receipts from the Eritrean Embassy in Germany, including meticulous information regarding annual tax payments and donations made during the border war. In order to obtain clearance, it is necessary to have made full payments from 1991 up to the current year.
12 The term "martyr" refers to those who died as fighters during the independence struggle or as soldiers during the border war, and has quasi-religious undertones to it (cf. Conrad 2010: 182, Footnote 16). Another important point is that diaspora Eritreans not only contribute directly to government channels, but also provide a survival network for their relatives at home in the face of the regime's unsustainable economic and social policies. In addition, they are increasingly financing the exodus of their kin (Styan 2007: 16-18) , including the payment of the fees and ransoms charged by people smugglers and human traffickers.
The Political Culture of the Eritrean Diaspora
While it is understandable that Eritreans pay the 2 percent tax due to coercion or sentimental needs such as burying their dead in the homeland, 14 their readiness to voluntarily support a regime that has developed into a pariah state with an appalling human rights record during the past decade is more questionable. The mindset of government supporters can best be described by their inability to distinguish between:
Eritrea as an idea (or national "imagined community" 15 ), Eritrea as an institution (the state whose structures have become closely intertwined with that of the ruling party)
and Eritrea as enabled, embodied, symbolized, and represented first by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and then the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) under Isaias Afewerki. (Conrad 2010: 166) 13 The government-friendly madote.com wrote in 2010 that the housing complex, which allegedly would include a swimming pool and a tennis court, was in the final stages of completion. Instead of showing photos of the houses taken on the ground, though, it instead presented dubious satellite photos purportedly indicating that "progress" had been made -and added photos of existing new buildings in other neighborhoods of Asmara.
Online at: <www.madote.com/2010/07/photos-of-new-asmara-housing.html>, accessed 8 June 2013.
14 Being buried in one's adi (village of origin) is a deeply entrenched desire, especially in the Tigrinya culture. Thus, it is the conviction of many Eritreans that disloyalty to the government means betrayal of the people. As there is no distinction (real or imagined) between the EPLF/PFDJ and the government, to criticize the leadership means to weaken the nation -and thereby the people as well (ibid.: 170). This fear is nurtured by both the conspiracy theories that are spread by the ruling elite and the enduring "no war, no peace" situation with Ethiopia. Diaspora Eritreans are more concerned with protecting Eritrea's sovereignty than with facing the truth about the dire internal situation and the suffering of their brothers and sisters inside the country. However, Ethiopia as a "fear factor" has lost much of its edge during recent years, 16 Interestingly, Samia Tecle consistently uses the word "state" when describing activities of the government, an indicator for the fact that even she as a scholar who is aware of the regime's tactics equates it and its actions with the state, and not with the institution (PFDJ) that controls it.
17 Ironically, the initiation of the YPFDJ took place shortly after the introduction of the WYDC in Eritrea, which has subjected the young generation in the homeland to indefinite military service. (Tecle 2012: 70) . While the state presents itself as inclusive and welcoming toward the diaspora youth, it shows its ugly, militaristic face to the young generation inside Eritrea -which is exploited through the practice of indefinite national service, thrown into jail or shot when trying to escape the country or left to their fate as victims of human trafficking in the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. Accordingly, there is a deep rift between the thousands of newly arriving refugees and those who grew up away from their homeland, including sharp and often irreconcilable differences vis-à-vis the perception of "reality." As Tecle points out, "Eritreans, mainly in the diaspora, remain starkly polarized in response to homeland developments. Some mourn what has become of the country while others celebrate blissfully" (ibid.: 56).
Generally, the notion that an internal cohesion and sense of unity exists within the diaspora (as claimed by Al-Ali et al. 2001: 594) is fiction. Today, the diaspora can be roughly divided into four groups:
-"Permanent exiles" (mostly ELF veterans), who did not return to Eritrea after liberation due to fears of persecution.
-Former EPLF/PFDJ supporters abroad who became dissidents and are now in a "second exile".
-Exiled (former) members of the present government and the large group of youths who left the country illegally as draft deserters, who can be called the "new exiles".
-A group without -or with only loose -political affiliations that is now well-integrated in the host country (Conrad 2010: 22; see also, Koser 2007: 247) . In contrast, the opposition is characterized by divisions and mutual mistrust. In between the two camps stands a "silent majority," which can be subdivided into passive government supporters, passive critics, those shifting between the two camps and those who have disengaged from Eritrean nationalism altogether. It can be assumed that most of those in the apolitical grouping still send private remittances out of feelings of social obligation, which indirectly supports the government. 20
4 Sanctions, the Diaspora and the Slow Demise of the Eritrean Regime
Reactions to Sanctions by Government Supporters
The government's reaction to the imposition of sanctions corresponded to its established pat- The Isaias regime instrumentalized the sanctions as a way to create a "rally around the flag" effect and to remobilize the diaspora communities who had become tired of the continuous financial demands made by the government. The PFDJ resorted to an instrument of the liberation struggle, calling for a hzbawi mekete (resolute national rebuff). In February 2010, the regime organized demonstrations of progovernment Eritreans against the sanctions at the UN's headquarters in Geneva, as well as in Washington DC, San Francisco and Canberra.
The aim was to denounce the "unfounded and vicious US-engineered sanction resolution against Eritrea." It is unclear how many Eritreans participated in these events, but the claims made by government sources that "hundreds of thousands participated" seem grossly overestimated. 23 According to police statements, some five thousand participants from all over and indicated that diaspora Eritreans in the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia and New
Zealand were involved in antisanction activities. 27 In Germany, this activity manifested itself in a party-like event in Berlin, where around one hundred Eritreans danced at Alexanderplatz. 28 Generally, it seems that the staging of public protests against the sanction regime has "run out of steam" (I2) and has not shown any tangible effect on international public opinion. However, the fact that thousands of Eritreans lined up to see President Isaias in New York in September 2011 during a rare visit to the United States is a clear indicator that the regime still enjoys considerable support among the diaspora. 29 Yet the most important part of the regime's hzbawi mekete strategy is related to fundraising. Based on the notion that the sanctions are an immediate threat to the trinity of nation, government and the people -without bothering to deal with the accusations made by the UNSC in relation to the regime's belligerent policy -it has held numerous gatherings and seminars in all countries with a significant diaspora population with the purpose of extracting funds. As has been mentioned, this is not a new invention triggered by the imposition of the sanction regime but rather a proven method of mobilization established during the independence struggle. To give an impression of the nature of these meetings, I cite a report typi- "Commitment to national development programs" means an obligation to make donations to the government. Thus, the sanctions have been strengthening the capability of the regime to extract funds from diaspora Eritreans by enabling it to revive its notion of an international (US-led) conspiracy. Ironically, the government's recent involvement in the trafficking of its own people by handing them over to Bedouins who hold them hostage on the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and extort ransoms of up to 50,000 USD per refugee (van Reisen et al. 2012 ) has had a negative effect on the progovernment factions' willingness to give. First, the fact that their own relatives are potential victims of trafficking has seen these groups hold on to their savings to be able to pay, if need be, any potential ransom. Second, the efforts of the Monitoring Group, diaspora civil society groups and activists like Elsa Chyrum (Human Rights Concern Eritrea) and Meron Estefanos (Radio Erena, cf. I5) have created an awareness about these criminal practices, which has also deterred financial contributions -especially among less fanatical government supporters.
Reactions to the Sanctions by the Opposition Camp
Initially, PFDJ dissidents among the diaspora (EDP/EPDP) were reluctant to welcome the sanctions because they were still at odds with the Ethiopian government who had initiated their imposition, while other opposition groups -namely, the ELF factions and the youth movements -welcomed them. When the first report of the Monitoring Group (S/2011/433) revealed the criminal practices of the regime related to weapons smuggling, human trafficking and tax extortion, several opposition groups set out to further discredit the government and to lobby their host governments to take action against these deeds, focusing in particular on the 2 percent levy. The extended sanction regime of December 2011: without much success. In Sweden, a draft law to prohibit the tax failed because the government wanted to maintain a "dialogue" with the regime, which has been holding an Eritrean journalist with Swedish nationality in captivity for twelve years (I4).
Another issue raised by the Monitoring Group is the regime's involvement in the trafficking of refugees who end up in the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula where they are tortured as a way to extract high ransoms from their relatives in diaspora communities (van Reisen et al. 2012 ).
This issue concerns all diaspora Eritreans irrespective of their political orientation. However, government supporters are not able to express their dismay without being considered traitors. As a matter of fact, the government denies any involvement in these practices. 37 If she failed to pay, they threatened to kill a relative of hers who was captured in Egypt and to "remove his organs from his body." The man later died following his torture. On the other side, the new opposition youth groups have gained confidence and have been challenging government supporters, who are on the retreat in the public spaces that they used to control through their network of informants (I2, I3, I4). Yared Fisshaye, opposition activist and co-founder of the Eritrean Youth Movement for Change Oslo, explained that "the effects of the sanctions on the diaspora are remarkable. Before the sanctions, lots of people were participating in the fundraising parties of the government. But now, when they rent a hall for one thousand persons, only two hundred show up" (I3). In spite of this optimistic assessment, the diaspora's success in making use of the imposition of sanctions to lobby against the regime has ultimately been limited due to the opposition's failure to organize 41 The progovernment media have been quick to flag up such events, which carry the risk of discrediting the opposition youth movements.
The neutral or apolitical members of the diaspora are less willing to pay the 2 percent tax.
Due to the adverse living conditions faced inside Eritrea, they have to continually send more money to support their relatives. Many of them are affected by the ongoing human trafficking operations or fear that family members might be kidnapped and that they will consequently be forced to pay a ransom. Thus, "they are now less willing to pay money for the PFDJʹs fundraising campaigns, and many are keeping a low profile and staying out of politics" (I1).
Conclusion: Will Sanctions Facilitate Regime Change?
Currently, the Eritrean regime -and along with it the State of Eritrea -is in steady decline.
However, sanctions are not playing a major role in this process; they are rather a side effect of President Isaias's policy of militarizing the entire society and choosing a path of belligerence and international isolation. Sanctions have been successful in diminishing Eritrea's role as a regional spoiler, but their impact on facilitating regime change has been indirect at best.
They are one of a number of different factors, most of them homegrown, that are contributing to the demise of a regime that has sanctioned itself more than the international community has ever done. It must be stressed that the UNSC sanction regime is not designed to bring about regime change, but rather to impede Eritrea's military adventures through an arms embargo. The second component -targeted sanctions against members of the ruling elite -have so far not been implemented and there are no indications that this will happen at any point in the near future either.
One important side effect of the sanctions -generated by the reports of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea -is the increased awareness among parts of the Eritrean diaspora and the international community of the regime's opaqueness and its involvement in regime has until now been only limited. A considerable number of diaspora Eritreans continue to pay the tax -partly out of the conviction that they are supporting a noble cause, partly out of coercion. Coercion may be created through the denial of vital consular services, but also through the labeling of individuals who are unwilling to pay as "traitors" and the excluding of them from government-friendly social networks. In this regard, the sanctions have played a considerable role in providing opponents of the tax with a justification for withholding their money and have driven the regime's supporters into a tight corner.
The Monitoring Group has also brought to light the coercive practices used by Eritrea's foreign embassies, consulates and appointed agents to collect the tax from diaspora Eritreans, which goes to the PFDJ's unaccountable coffers (UNSC 2011: 102-108) . Thus, the 2011 sanction resolution justified regime opponents' demands that their host governments prohibit solicitation of the 2 percent tax. As a reaction, some countries -among them Canada and Germany -have imposed measures intended to prevent the tax from being collected (UNSC 2012: 9). However, the regime has well-established informal channels to raise these funds.
Therefore, the fact that the number of Eritreans willing to pay is decreasing from year to year is more important than formal restrictions.
In conclusion, the sanctions have had a dual effect at the transnational level. On the one hand, they have created a "rally around the flag" effect with increased fundraising activities on the part of staunch PFDJ supporters -especially in the immediate aftermath of their imposition. On the other hand, they have attributed additional legitimacy to the emergent Arab Spring-inspired antigovernment youth movements. Furthermore, the UN Human Rights
Council finally appointed a Special Rapporteur to investigate the Eritrean human rights situation in 2012, a long overdue act that was probably facilitated by the imposition of the sanction regime. Sanctions may also have had an adverse effect on any future investments being made by Western mining companies in Eritrea, since the international community is now obliged to look into the use of revenues generated through mining.
All in all, the Eritrean regime under the leadership of Isaias Afewerki has been digging its own grave in recent years with its self-destructive policies -the worst of which has been the militarization of the country's entire society. Although sanctions imposed have accelerated this process, they have also brought to light the deplorable state of the opposition among the diaspora as well as its lack of capacity to profit from this opportunity -the possible exception being some youth organizations. In the words of human rights activist Meron
Estefanos, "the leaders of the opposition parties have been in power as long as Isaias or even
longer. So what makes the difference? Isaias is not the only problem; it is also the state of the opposition" (I5). As things stand, even if the sanctions imposed do ultimately help facilitate regime change in the country, Eritrea's road to democracy will still be a long and stony one.
